Self-Disclosure Management Program
In an era of increasing regulatory enforcement and economic sanctions, businesses face significant risks associated with inadvertent violations of U.S. export control and sanctions laws. Compliance Solutions offers an unparalleled Self-Disclosure Management Program designed to protect corporate officers and their organizations from civil penalties and criminal prosecution. We conduct independent investigations, collect admissible evidence, and prepare voluntary self-disclosure applications for presentation to the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Security Division (NSD). No other firm provides this level of comprehensive, end-to-end support.
The U.S. government aggressively enforces compliance with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and economic sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). Companies that fail to voluntarily self-disclose potential violations risk:
The DOJ, OFAC, and the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) have all emphasized the importance of voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) programs. Entities that self-report violations before government agencies initiate investigations can avoid criminal liability, secure reduced fines, and protect their leadership from personal liability.
Our Self-Disclosure Management Program is designed to provide a structured, legally sound pathway to compliance and mitigation. We handle every step of the process, ensuring that businesses meet regulatory expectations and secure the most favorable outcomes. Our approach includes:
Unlike traditional law firms or compliance consultants, Compliance-Solutions.pro integrates:
The U.S. government has pursued aggressive enforcement actions against companies and individuals involved in sanctions violations. Recent cases illustrate the severity of penalties and highlight the necessity of self-disclosure:
By engaging Compliance-Solutions.pro, corporations can:
Time is critical in mitigating regulatory and criminal exposure. If your company suspects it has engaged in transactions involving sanctioned entities, restricted exports, or other violations of U.S. law, immediate action is essential.
Contact Compliance-Solutions.pro today to initiate an independent investigation and secure the best possible resolution under the DOJ’s Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program.
(NOTE: Special access programs (SAPs) in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular (collateral) classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations, such as COMSEC maintenance or presidential transportation support. In addition to collateral controls, a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements, specialized nondisclosure agreements, special terminology or markings, exclusion from standard contract investigations (carve-outs), and centralized billet systems. Within the Department of Defense, SAP is better known as "SAR" by the mandatory Special Access Required (SAR) markings. All C-Suite Executives applying to the Golden Parachute Program are processed under a Subversa SAP that provides more robust operational security safeguards than Compartmentalized Secret Information (SCI) or Secret information which is necessary and prudent under the circumstances.)
OFAC (Office of Foreign Asset Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury) publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called “Specially Designated Nationals” or “SDNs.” The assets of an SDN are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from all dealings with any SDN. OFAC also publishes a consolidated list of individuals and companies subject to less-than full blocking sanctions, where U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in certain types of transactions with the listed person.
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT AND DESIGNATION ACTIONS
Companies should also review BIS (Bureau of Industry and Security) and OFAC enforcement and targeting actions, as they often reflect certain tactics and methods used by intermediaries engaged in Russia related sanctions and export evasion. In November 2022, for example, OFAC designated individuals and entities involved in a global procurement network maintained by a Russian microelectronics company, AO PKK Milandr, which used a front company to transfer funds from Milandr to another front in a third country, which purchased microchips to divert to Russia. Another front company elsewhere also purchased Asian-made components for Milandr. OFAC’s civil enforcement actions also illustrate a range of sanctions evasion techniques employed across multiple sanctions programs, including falsifying transactional documents, omitting information from internal correspondence, and shipping goods through third countries. Similarly, BIS imposed an administrative penalty of $497,000 on Vorago Technologies, an Austin, Texas company, for shipping integrated circuit components, which are critical components in missiles and military satellites, to Russia via a Bulgarian front company. BIS has also imposed restrictions on seven Iranian drone entities in January 2023 due to their production of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) used by Russia against Ukraine. These Iranian UAV entities, which, according to public reporting, had been using diverted U.S.- branded parts and components, were also sanctioned by OFAC.
DOJ has pursued criminal charges against those who it alleges are using front companies and intermediate transshipment points to evade Russia-related U.S. sanctions and export controls. These cases highlight additional tactics used for evasion purposes. For example, in October 2022, DOJ unsealed an indictment charging six Russian nationals and one Spanish national with multiple offenses arising from the defendants’ alleged operation of a network of shell companies designed to enable them to illegally export military and sensitive dual-use items to Russia and embargoed Venezuelan oil to Russian and Chinese end users. Two months later, DOJ unsealed an indictment charging five Russian nationals, including a suspected Federal Security Service officer, and two U.S. citizens with violating U.S. sanctions and export controls in a global procurement and money laundering scheme for the Russian government. In both cases, DOJ alleges that the defendants used shell companies and transshipment points in third-party countries to evade sanctions and procure powerful dual-use items for use by the Russian defense sector. The sensitive items at issue included advanced electronics and sophisticated testing equipment used in quantum computing, hypersonic, and nuclear weapons development as well as advanced semiconductors and microprocessors used in fighter aircraft,
missile systems, smart munitions, radar, and satellites. In one of the cases, the indictment alleges that U.S.-manufactured component parts were found in seized Russian weapons platforms in Ukraine.
The allegations in the indictments describe tactics that the defendants purportedly employed to evade detection, including the following:
Claiming that shell companies located in third countries were intermediaries or end-users; in one case, DOJ alleges that only one of the five intermediary parties had any
visible signage and consisted of an empty room in a strip mall;
Claiming that certain items would be used by entities engaged in activities subject to less stringent oversight; on at least one occasion, a defendant allegedly claimed that an
item would be used by Russian space program entities, when in fact the item was suitable for military aircraft or missile systems only;
Dividing shipments of controlled items into multiple, smaller shipments to try to avoid law enforcement detection;
Using aliases for the identities of the intermediaries and end users;
Transferring funds from shell companies in foreign jurisdictions into U.S. bank accounts and quickly forwarding or distributing funds to obfuscate the audit trail or the foreign
source of the money;
Making false or misleading statements on shipping forms, including underestimating the purchase price of merchandise by more than five times the actual amount;
Claiming to do business not on behalf of a restricted end user but rather on behalf of a U.S.-based shell company.
Given the proliferation of sanctions and export controls imposed in response to Russia’s unjust war, multinational companies should be vigilant in their compliance efforts and be on the lookout for possible attempts to evade U.S. laws. The U.S. government has a variety of tools to crack down on evasion efforts, and the past year has shown that it will not hesitate to pursue criminal prosecutions, administrative enforcement actions, or additional designations where the circumstances so warrant. Businesses of all stripes should act responsibly by implementing rigorous compliance controls, or they or their business partners risk being the targets of regulatory action, administrative enforcement action, or criminal investigation.
VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURE POLICIES
Parties who believe that they may have violated sanctions or export control laws should voluntarily self-disclose the conduct to the relevant agency. Information about BIS’s Voluntary Self-Disclosure (“VSD”) Policy can be found in Part 764.5 of the Export Administration Regulations or in the enforcement section of BIS’s
website: www.bis.doc.gov.
OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, which provide incentives for voluntary self-disclosure, are available at 31 CFR Part 501, Appendix A as well as in OFAC
Frequently Asked Questions: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/faqs/13.
All potentially criminal violations of sanctions and export control laws should be disclosed to the Department of Justice’s National Security Division,
Counterintelligence and Export Control Section. More information about DOJ’s VSD Policy is available at DOJ.gov
All DOJ components and offices that prosecute corporate crime now have a voluntary self-disclosure policy that is publicly available on their websites. These policies set forth the component’s expectations of what constitutes a voluntary self-disclosure, including with regard to the timing of the disclosure, the need for the disclosure to be accompanied by timely preservation, collection, and production of relevant documents and/or information, and a description of the types of information and facts that should be provided as part of the disclosure process. The policies also lay out the benefits that corporations can expect to receive if they meet the standards for voluntary self-disclosure under that component’s policy, and what circumstances constitute aggravating factors under the component’s policy.
Specifically, all Department components must adhere to the following three principles regarding voluntary self-disclosure:
First, absent aggravating factors, the Department will not seek a guilty plea where a corporation is determined to have met the requirements of the applicable voluntary self-disclosure policy, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated the criminal conduct. Each Department component shall define such aggravating factors in their written policies.
Second, the Department will not require the imposition of an independent compliance monitor for a cooperating corporation that is determined to have met the requirements of the applicable voluntary self-disclosure policy and, at the time of resolution, demonstrates it has implemented and tested an effective compliance program. Such decisions about the imposition of a monitor will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis and at the sole discretion of the Department. See JM 9-28.1700.
Third, the Department will apply a presumption in favor of declining prosecution of a corporation that voluntarily self-disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated misconduct uncovered as a result of due diligence conducted shortly before or shortly after a lawful, bona fide acquisition of another corporate entity, subject to the requirements described in Section 9-28.900(A)(3) of the Justice Manual. The mission of the National Security Division (NSD) of the Department of Justice is to carry out the Department’s highest priority: to protect and defend the United States against the full range of national security threats, consistent with the rule of law. Business organizations and their employees are at the forefront of NSD’s efforts to protect the national security of the United States by preventing the unlawful export of sensitive commodities, technologies, and services, as well as unlawful transactions with sanctioned countries and designated individuals and entities. Enforcing our export control and sanctions laws, and holding accountable those who violate them, is a top priority for NSD.
As the gatekeepers of U.S. export-controlled technologies and integral actors in the U.S. financial system, business organizations play a vital role in protecting our national security. NSD strongly encourages companies to voluntarily self-disclose directly to NSD all potentially criminal (i.e., willful) violations of the U.S. government’s primary export control and sanctions regimes—
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778,
the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), 50 U.S.C. § 4819, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1705
as well as potential violations of other criminal statutes that affect national security because they arise out of or relate to the enforcement of export control and sanctions
laws, such as money laundering, bank fraud, smuggling, fraudulent importation, and false statement offenses. See Justice Manual § 9-90.020(A)(2).
Violations of U.S. export control and sanctions laws harm our national security or have the potential to cause such harm, and this threat to national security informs how NSD arrives at an appropriate resolution with a business organization that violates such laws and distinguishes these cases from other types of corporate wrongdoing. Federal prosecutors must balance the goal of encouraging voluntary self-disclosures and cooperation against the goal of deterring these very serious offenses. This Enforcement Policy sets forth the criteria that NSD, in partnership with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and other Department litigating components, uses in determining an appropriate resolution for organizations that make a voluntary self-disclosure in export control and sanctions matters. This Enforcement Policy further explains the criteria NSD uses in determining when an acquiring company that makes a voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct by an acquired entity can qualify for the additional protections of the Mergers and Acquisitions Policy (M&A Policy). Prosecutors will weigh and appropriately credit all timely voluntary self-disclosures on a case-by-case basis pursuant to this Enforcement Policy and applicable Department guidance.
With the above goals in mind, this Enforcement Policy provides that when a company (1)voluntarily self-discloses to NSD potentially criminal violations arising out of or relating to the enforcement of export control or sanctions laws (2) fully cooperates, and (3) timely and appropriately remediates, absent aggravating factors and consistent with the definitions below, NSD generally will not seek a guilty plea, and there is a presumption that the company will receive a non-prosecution agreement and will not pay a fine. Aggravating factors, as described below,
include conduct that involves a grave threat to national security; exports of items that are particularly sensitive or to end users that are of heightened concern; repeated violations; involvement of senior management; and significant profit. In cases where the principles of federal prosecution so warrant, NSD has the discretion to issue a declination.
Companies that qualify for a non-prosecution agreement or declination, where appropriate, will not be permitted to retain any of the unlawfully obtained gains from the misconduct at issue. Companies will be required to pay all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue. Where another authority collects disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution, the Department will apply, in appropriate circumstances, its policy on coordination of corporate resolution penalties, Justice Manual § 1-12.100. In addition, NSD generally will not require the imposition of an independent compliance monitor for a cooperating company that is determined to
have met the requirements of this Enforcement Policy and, at the time of resolution, demonstrates it has implemented and tested an effective compliance program.
If, due to aggravating factors, such as those described below, a different criminal resolution—i.e., a deferred prosecution agreement or guilty plea—is warranted for a company that has voluntarily self-disclosed to NSD, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated, NSD:
Will accord, or recommend to a sentencing court, a fine that is, at least, 50% less than the amount that otherwise would be available under the alternative fine provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(d). In other words, NSD will seek a fine capped at an amount equal to the gross gain or gross loss; • Will recommend full satisfaction of forfeiture obligations through payment of forfeiture in an amount no greater than that representing the value of proceeds received by the company, including in cases where an underlying forfeiture money judgment would include amounts exceeding such proceeds.
In assessing the appropriate form of the resolution, will generally not require a corporate guilty plea absent the presence of particularly egregious or multiple aggravating factors;
Will generally not require appointment of a monitor if a company has, at the time of resolution, demonstrated that it has implemented and tested an effective and well designed compliance program and has taken appropriate steps to remediate the root cause f the misconduct. Nothing in this Enforcement Policy affects NSD’s ability to prosecute individuals.
Definitions
For purposes of this Enforcement Policy, the following definitions apply:
1. Voluntary Self-Disclosure
In evaluating self-disclosure, NSD will make a careful assessment of the circumstances of the disclosure, including the extent to which the disclosure permitted NSD to preserve and obtain evidence as part of its investigation. NSD encourages self-disclosure of potential wrongdoing at the earliest possible time, even when a company has not yet completed an internal investigation, if it chooses to conduct one. NSD will require the following for a company to receive credit for voluntary self-disclosure of wrongdoing:
The voluntary disclosure must be to NSD;
The company has no preexisting obligation to disclose misconduct to any Department component, or federal or state regulator, or foreign regulatory or law enforcement entity;
The company discloses the conduct to NSD “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation,” U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1);
The company discloses the conduct to NSD “within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware” of the potential violation, U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1), with the burden on the company to demonstrate timeliness; and the company discloses all relevant non-privileged facts known to it at the time of the disclosure, including all relevant facts and evidence about all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, including individuals inside and outside of the company regardless of their position.
The mission of the National Security Division is to protect the United States from threats to our national security by pursuing justice through the law. The NSD's organizational structure is designed to ensure greater coordination and unity of purpose between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, on the one hand, and intelligence attorneys and the Intelligence Community, on the other, thus strengthening the effectiveness of the federal government's national security efforts.
National Security Division: https://www.justice.gov/nsd
National Security Division Email: https://nsd.public@justice.com
Compliance-Solutions.pro Golden Parachute Management is the end-to-end facilitator and sole U.S.-based representative for C-Suite executives facing potential criminal charges for violating the Export Control Act or U.S. Sanctions against Russia. We will investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation and generate a formal verified investigative report, conduct a forensic level audit of international bills of lading and customs export declarations, financial transactions and other information which we create a chain of judicially admissible evidence, interview witnesses and co-conspirators, facilitators and third parties material to the violation. All of which is conducted under absolute secrecy and extreme discretion, once the DoJ launches an investigation it's too late. We then prepare the Self-Declaration Program package and personally present the information directly to the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s at the National Security Division, U. S. Department of Justice in Washington, DC as the executives attorney-in-fact, and we stand independently, under no duty to disclose, meaning that the executives are insured extreme discretion and secrecy.
The Criminal Division has launched a Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosures for Individuals designed to encourage voluntary self-disclosure by individual participants in certain types of criminal conduct involving corporations. In exchange for self-disclosing, fully cooperating with authorities, and paying any applicable victim compensation, restitution, forfeiture, or disgorgement, including returning any ill-gotten gains, the Criminal Division will enter into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) where certain specified conditions are met. This Pilot Program provides transparency regarding the circumstances in which Criminal Division prosecutors will offer mandatory NPAs to incentivize individuals (and their counsel) to provide original and actionable information. Receiving such information will help us investigate and prosecute criminal conduct that might otherwise go undetected or be impossible to prove, and will, in turn, further encourage companies to create compliance programs that help prevent, detect, and remediate misconduct and to report misconduct when it occurs.
email address: NPA.Pilot@usdoj.gov
If you are reporting criminal activity in which you did not meaningfully participate, that is conduct in which you did not participate at all or could only be considered a minimal participant (plainly among the least culpable), you may be eligible for the Criminal Division’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program. More information is available at justice.gov/CorporateWhistleblower
The Department of Justice (Department) is dedicated to vigorously investigating and prosecuting federal criminal offenses, including crimes by, through, or related to corporations. Use of cooperating witnesses in investigations and prosecutions, discretionary grants of immunity, and entry into non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) in return for a person’s cooperation have long been a part of the federal criminal system and are addressed by the Department’s Justice Manual, see JM 9-27.600 et seq. (explaining, inter alia, criteria for entry of non-prosecution agreements with cooperating witnesses, including supervisory approval and that any such agreement be in the public interest); U.S.S.G. §§ 5K1.1, 5K2.16; Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003.
The prospect of an NPA may provide a strong incentive for individuals to bring to the Criminal Division’s and law enforcement’s attention actionable, original information about criminal conduct that might otherwise go undetected or be impossible to prove. The Criminal Division’s grant of an NPA to individuals who report misconduct to law enforcement in the context of corporate and white-collar criminal offenses also may be a particularly important incentive for companies to create compliance programs that encourage robust internal reporting of complaints, that help prevent, detect, and remediate misconduct before it begins or expands, and that allow companies to report misconduct when it occurs. This Pilot Program provides transparency regarding the circumstances in which Criminal Division prosecutors will offer NPAs to individuals who voluntarily disclose original information about certain types of criminal conduct involving corporations, fully cooperate with authorities, and pay any applicable victim compensation, restitution, forfeiture, or disgorgement, including returning any ill-gotten gains.
The Pilot Program applies to Criminal Division investigations of the offenses outlined below and applies to disclosures made on or after April 15, 2024. The Pilot Program does not modify or amend existing Department or Division policies or directives, or provisions of the Justice Manual. While the Pilot Program is in effect, the Criminal Division will collect anonymized statistical data about relevant disclosures, for the purposes of determining whether to extend, modify, or end the Pilot Program.
When an individual voluntarily self-discloses original information about criminal misconduct, including the complete extent of their own role in the misconduct, fully cooperates, and satisfies the other conditions set forth below, the reporting individual will receive an NPA.
1. The disclosure must be to the Criminal Division at NPA.Pilot@usdoj.gov.
2. The reporting individual must disclose original information, meaning non-public information not previously known to the Criminal Division or to any component of the Department of Justice, and the information provided must relate to at least one of the following:
Violations by financial institutions, their insiders, or agents, including schemes involving money laundering, anti-money laundering, registration of money transmitting businesses, and fraud statutes, and fraud against or compliance with financial institution regulators; o Violations related to integrity of financial markets undertaken
(1) by financial institutions, investment advisors, or investment funds,
(2) by or through public companies or private companies with 50 or more employees, or
(3) by any insiders or agents of any such entities; o Violations related to foreign corruption and bribery by, through, or related to public or private companies, including violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, violations of the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, and violations of the money laundering statutes;
Violations related to health care fraud or illegal health care kickbacks committed by or through public companies or private companies with 50 or more employees; o Violations by or through public or private companies with 50 or more employees related to fraud against, or the deception of, the United States in connection with federally funded contracting, where such fraud does not involve health care or illegal health care kickbacks; and
Violations committed by or through public or private companies related to the payment of bribes or kickbacks to domestic public officials.
3. The disclosure must be voluntary, meaning
(1) before any request, inquiry, or demand that relates to the subject matter of the submission is directed to the individual or anyone representing the individual (e.g., his or her legal representative) by the Department in connection with any investigation, or by a federal law enforcement, regulatory, or civil enforcement agency regarding the same misconduct;
(2) where the individual has no preexisting obligation pursuant to an agreement in connection with a criminal prosecution or civil enforcement action to report the information to the Criminal Division, any Department component, or any federal law enforcement, regulatory, or civil enforcement agency; and
(3) in the absence of any government investigation or threat of imminent disclosure to the government or the public.
4. The disclosure must be truthful and complete, meaning it must include all information known to the individual related to any misconduct in which the individual has participated and/or of which the individual is aware, including the complete extent of the individual’s own role in the misconduct, and all matters about which the Department may inquire.
5. The reporting individual must agree to fully cooperate with and be willing and able to provide substantial assistance to the Department in its investigation of related conduct and prosecution of equally or more culpable individuals or entities including, but not limited to, providing truthful and complete testimony and evidence, whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding; producing documents, records, and other evidence when called upon by the Criminal Division; and, if requested, working in a proactive manner under the supervision of, and in compliance with United States law enforcement officers and agents.
6. The reporting individual must agree to forfeit or disgorge any profit from the criminal wrongdoing and pay restitution or victim compensation.
7. The reporting individual:
(1) has not engaged in criminal conduct involving violence, use of force, threats, substantial patient harm, any sex offense involving fraud, force, or coercion, or relating to a minor, or any offense involving terrorism;
(2) is not the Chief Executive Officer (or equivalent) or Chief Financial Officer (or equivalent) of a public or private company or is not the organizer/leader of the scheme;
(3) is not an elected or appointed foreign government official;
(4) is not a domestic government official at any level, including any employee of a law enforcement agency; and
(5) does not have a previous felony conviction or a conviction of any kind for conduct involving fraud or dishonesty.
Separate and apart from this Pilot Program, Criminal Division prosecutors retain discretion to offer an NPA to individuals in appropriate circumstances, including where individuals come forward pursuant to the Pilot Program but the criteria above are not met in full, in accordance with the Justice Manual and Criminal Division procedures.
When a C-Suite executive contacts us regarding their desire to participate in the voluntary self disclosure (VSD) program, whether it's with the National Security Division, the Criminal Division or the Civil Division, we are here to help. We understand the process that is required to be followed meticulously, there's very specific requirements. When the C-Suite executive retains us we conduct a professional fraud investigation with experienced crime scene detectives, forensic auditors, and licensed white collar crime detectives. We prepare the VDP package for the U.S. Attorney and we represent the executive as their Attorney-in-Fact, the package is prepared and evaluated by former Department of Justice prosecutors from major crimes units, ad hoc policy advisors from the Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Center FINCEN and former forensic analysts from the Internal Revenue Service. All evidence collected, is officially logged, preserved and accompanied with the initial package.
All of the activities related to the alleged violations and the executives application to the program are kept under military-grade secrecy with a very high level of discretion as it's a very delicate balance that needs to be maintained when resolving issues of this kind. Every executive is represented by 3 top Tirer-1 Federal attorney's; a Federal criminal law attorney, a corporate/mergers and acquisition attorney and a Federal constitutional law attorney. Our licensed Federal attorneys know the process and they are supported by a team of administrative procedures specialist, DoJ policy SMEs and legal assistants experienced in Federal protocol, all of whom conduct their activities in secret with no duty to disclose the investigation until we present the verified package to the U.S. Attorney in which ever component of the DoJ is providing the opportunity under the program. Each DoJ component has it's own self-disclosure program and we have expertise in all of them. If you're an executive that has gotten caught up in criminal wrongdoing, we may be your only hope of evading prison time with a no guilty plea (NGP) agreement. Our Federal Attorneys are from the following nationally recognized Tier-1 Law Firms:
We also only utilize certified experts from Several associations with focus on fraud investigation, including the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the Anti-Fraud Alliance (AFA), and the California Financial Crimes Investigators Association (CFCIA), among others. Additionally, For criminal investigators and white-collar crime detectives, some relevant associations we support include the National Association of Legal Investigators (NALI) (NALI), the International Crime Scene Investigators Association (ICSIA) (ICSIA), the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA) (ASCIA), and the International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators (IAFCI).
